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Chapter 1
What is value? Where does it come 
from? A philosophical perspective
Christine Tappolet and Mauro Rossi
Introduction
A philosopher loves a distinction as much as any other theorist. When asked what value 
is, philosophers are likely to point out that this question splits into several distinct ones 
depending on what is considered. In common parlance, talk of values is oen about what 
is deemed good, such as when we say that knowledge or justice are values, which ought 
to be promoted. Talk about values is also oen talk about ideals that guide ones actions, 
such as when we maintain that democracy and autonomy are Western values, or when 
we speak of reliability and integrity as someones personal values. Ideals, things that are 
considered to be good and, more generally, substantive claims about values, are important 
topics in philosophy and ethics, but they are far from the only ones. e prime focus in the 
philosophy of values is on more abstract questions. Philosophers commonly distinguish 
between evaluative concepts, evaluative judgments, evaluative sentences, and evaluative 
facts. ese are the items at the heart of philosophical debates about values. For each of 
these, there is room for asking what it is, and there are no grounds for expecting that the 
answers to the question about their nature should be exactly the same. is simply follows 
from the fact that concepts, judgments, sentences, and facts are very dierent kinds of 
things, so that even if the questions they raise are connected, they cannot but be distinct.
Suppose we agree that pain is bad. Is there an objective fact of the matter as to whether 
this is so or is the badness of pain a purely subjective question? is question, which con-
cerns the nature of evaluative facts, is the topic of this chapter. As will become apparent, 
however, there are important connections between this question and the issues concern-
ing evaluative concepts, evaluative judgments, and evaluative sentences. We will proceed 
as follows. Our main aim is to present the arguments for and against the claim that there 
are objective evaluative facts (see Anti-realism vs. realism: the arguments). In the last sec-
tion (Perspectives), we sketch what seems a promising account, according to which evalu-
ative facts are fully objective, and yet closely tied to subjective responses. Put in a nutshell, 
the suggestion is that evaluative concepts are response-dependent, although they aim at 
picking out an objective evaluative reality. Before we launch into the arguments, we will 
start with a bit of groundwork. We will begin with a sketch of the dierent questions that 
are raised by the several items that need to be distinguished within the domain of values 
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(e many questions). On the basis of these distinctions, we will then present the main 
debates in the philosophy of values (e main debates). ese two sections will allow us to 
introduce the fundamental concepts in the philosophy of values. ey will also help clarify 
what it as stake in the controversy about the nature of evaluative facts.1
The many questions
To begin with, consider evaluative concepts, such as the concepts of the good, the desira-
ble, the admirable, the courageous, the generous, and the kind, on the positive side, and the 
concepts of the bad, the shameful, the despicable, the disgusting, the coward, and the ma-
levolent, on the negative side. Quite generally, concepts, and the propositions they form, 
are what we have in mind when we think; they constitute the contents of our thoughts. 
Concepts are oen considered the main objects of interest for philosophers. us, many 
philosophers use thought experiments and other similar tools with the aim of establishing 
conceptual (or analytical) truths regarding our concepts.
A number of questions are raised by evaluative concepts and their relation to other con-
cepts. What are concepts such as good, desirable, and admirable? How do they dier from 
other kinds of concepts, such as color or shape concepts? What is required to possess 
evaluative concepts? And how are they related to other kinds of concepts? A question that 
has been central in philosophical discussions is that of the relation between evaluative 
concepts and natural concepts. Natural concepts can be dened as the ones in which nat-
ural sciences, as well ason a liberal conception of natural conceptssocial and human 
sciences, including psychology, are couched (Moore 1903: 92; Smith 1994: 17). Insofar as 
concepts such as approbation, desire, or admiration are considered to be natural concepts, 
the question of how to conceive of the relation between evaluative concepts and emotion 
concepts is a question that raises the broad question of naturalism, that is, the question of 
how values t into the natural world. As many have noted, there seems to be a tight con-
nection between evaluative concepts and concepts picking out aective states (Mulligan 
1998). It seems dicult to deny that admirable and shameful, for instance, must be closely 
related to the concepts of admiration and shame, respectively. Aer all, there is no doubt 
that the terms used to pick out the evaluative concepts are lexically connected to terms re-
ferring to emotions. e question of how to conceive the exact relation between evaluative 
concepts and emotion concepts has thus been one of the foremost questions in the phil-
osophy of values. It is noteworthy that these questions regarding evaluative concepts are 
1 Our focus will be on the nature of evaluative facts, rather than on their origin. Two reasons explain our 
choice. First, in order to ask where something comes from, it is important to know what that thing is. Put 
dierently, the question of the origin depends on the question of the nature of the thing under consid-
eration. Second, depending on the account of what something is, the question of the origin can turn out 
to be irrelevant. For instance, even if one might ask what the origin of our concept of shape is, it seems 
irrelevant to ask where shapes come from. On most accounts, shapes are there in the world, instantiated 
by ordinary objects; they do not go anywhere and they do not come from anywhere in any philosophic-
ally interesting sense.
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analogous to, but distinct from, questions about the relation between evaluative properties 
and aective states, to which we will turn later.2
A distinct but related set of questions concern judgments like the judgments that know-
ledge is good, that Sarah is admirable, or that cheating is shameful.3 Such judgments 
clearly mobilize evaluative concepts. While concepts specify the content of judgments or, 
more generally, the content of thoughts, judgments are usually considered to be mental 
acts. Evaluative judgments raise the following questions. What is the nature of such judg-
ments and do they dier from other types of judgments? Can evaluative judgments be 
assessed in terms of truth? More generally, can they be considered to be cognitive, in the 
sense that they are on a par with judgments regarding matters of fact? How do they re-
late to other psychological entities, such as other types of judgments, as well as emotions, 
moods, desires, intentions, and decisions? In particular, a question that has been central in 
philosophical debates is whether it is true that evaluative judgments have a tight relation 
to motivation and action. If this is the case, what relation is it, exactly?4 As we will ex-
plain, this question is important because many have argued that the close relation between 
evaluative judgments and motivation sets them apart from other sorts of judgments.
Similar questions arise about evaluative language, that is, evaluative words and the sen-
tences they compose. Since the way we use evaluative language is easily observablein 
particular, it is easier to observe than concepts and mental actsthe study of evaluative 
sentences and words has oen been considered the best way to make progress in the phil-
osophy of values. e central question regarding evaluative language is that of the mean-
ing, or more generally, the function of terms such as good, admirable, and shameful, 
and more generally of sentences involving such terms, like knowledge is good, she 
is admirable, or what you did is shameful. How does the function of evaluative sen-
tences compare to the function of sentences such as this is red and this is triangular, 
which appear to aim at describing how things are, and which can be assessed in terms of 
truth? If evaluative sentences do not aim at describing things and are not genuinely truth- 
assessable, for what other purposes do we use them? Do we aim at expressing positive and 
negative emotions, such as when we use interjections like hurrah or boo? Or do we 
recommend or even prescribe courses of actions, such as when we use imperatives? On 
both these accounts, one would have a ready explanation of why the sincere assertion of 
evaluative sentences is closely connected to motivation.
Finally, philosophers have also been interested in the nature of what could make evalu-
ative sentences true, on the assumption that such sentences can be true. In consequence, 
philosophers have been questioning the nature of evaluative properties, such as the prop-
erty of being good or that of being admirable, and the corresponding evaluative facts. e 
2 See Deonna and Teroni, this volume, for a discussion of the relation between evaluative properties and 
emotions.
3 
ese are what psychologists call valuations.
4 See Sokol-Hessner and Phelps, this volume, and Jiga-Boy et al., this volume, for this question.
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debate about naturalism, which we have mentioned, is one that mainly concerns evaluative 
properties and facts. Hence, an important question in the philosophy of values is whether 
one can make room for such items in the natural world, and if this is not the case, whether 
it is a problem to postulate non-natural entities. However, the question that has worried 
philosophers most is whether there are objective evaluative properties that, when instan-
tiated by things, would constitute genuinely objective evaluative facts, i.e., facts that are 
part of the fabric of the world. On the face of it, it might well seem that talk of evaluative 
properties and facts is entirely wrongheaded. Values, it is oen believed, are in our head, 
not in the world.
Philosophers are not likely to rest content with these distinctions. ey will underline 
that questions regarding value split even further because, even if one keeps to one of the 
categories we have outlined, other distinctions still need to be made. For the sake of sim-
plicity, let us illustrate this with respect to evaluative concepts. A common distinction is 
that between the most general evaluative concepts, that is, good and bad, and what appear 
to be more specic evaluative concepts, such as admirable, shameful, courageous, or cruel. 
As we noted, the lexical connection between terms used to pick out concepts such as ad-
mirable and shameful and emotions terms, admiration and shame in this instance, sug-
gests that some of the more specic concepts have a tight relation to aective states. is 
is less clear of other specic concepts, such as courageous and cruel, which are considered 
to be paradigm cases of what philosophers, aer Bernard Williams (1985: 128130), call 
thick concepts. By contrast with thin concepts, such as good, which are taken to be purely 
evaluative or normative, thick concepts are thought to involve both an evaluative and a de-
scriptive or natural aspect. For example, the concept courageous is such that when we apply 
it (say) to an action, we not only evaluate the action positively, but we also attribute some 
specic natural properties, such as being performed in the face of risk.5 e question of the 
relation between thin and thick concepts is debated, but most agree that at least ordinarily, 
if something falls under a thick concept, then it also fall under a thin concept of the same 
valence. For example, what is considered courageous or generous, is ordinarily considered 
good. Given these distinctions among evaluative concepts and the corresponding distinc-
tions among dierent types of evaluative judgments, sentences, and facts, if there are such 
things as evaluative facts, the dierent questions we have spelt out divide even further. And 
again, one should be alert to the possibility that the answers might dier, depending on 
exactly what is considered.
But what is value, one might insist? Is there nothing general that can be said to demar-
cate what could be called the domain of values? To put the question dierently, what do 
evaluative concepts, evaluative judgments, evaluative sentences, and evaluative facts have 
in common? ere seems to be no way to shed light on what the evaluative is without 
presupposing some familiarity with it. What can be said, for instance, is that evaluative 
5 For further distinctions among thin concepts, such as intrinsic vs. extrinsic values, see Ronnow- 
Rasmussen and Rabinowicz, this volume.
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concepts are used to assess the worth of things, or that evaluative judgments express such 
assessments. But of course, to assess the worth of things is nothing but to evaluate things. 
What can be done, additionally, is to specify the relations between evaluative concepts and 
other kinds of concepts, such as emotion concepts. However, it is far from clear that by 
doing so, it is possible to spell out a denition of the evaluative that does not presuppose a 
prior grasp of that category. Not only is the exact relation between evaluative concepts and 
other types of concepts extremely controversial, but the most promising attempts to draw 
the relation between evaluative concepts and other types of concepts are openly circular. 
For instance, it seems a truism that something is good if, and only if, it makes some posi-
tive reaction appropriate, or that it is such as to give reasons to have a positive reaction 
toward it. However, it is notoriously dicult to say what it is to make a positive reaction 
appropriate without invoking the concept of the good. And the same appears true of the 
idea of reasons to have a positive reaction. How could one explain what it is to give reasons 
to have a positive reaction without making use of the notion of goodness? Given this, it 
appears that, by contrast to what is sometimes proposed, accounts of this kind cannot aim 
at reducing evaluative concepts to dierent kinds of concepts. e best way to understand 
such accounts is rather to see them as shedding light on evaluative concepts by spelling 
out the relations between evaluative concepts and other kinds of concepts. Put dierently, 
what such accounts propose, on this interpretation, are not reductions of any sorts, but 
conceptual elucidations.6
On a more positive note, what can be done to further our understanding of the domain 
of values is to contrast this domain with other domains. A point that is generally acknow-
ledged is that the evaluative is part of the normative, where the normative is understood as 
concerning what we ought to do, in contrast with what is the case (see Dancy 2000, inter 
alia). Moral claims regarding what we morally ought to do, but also claims about what an 
agent should do all things considered, are paradigmatic examples of normative claims. In 
so far as the evaluative is taken to be part of the normative, it thus falls on the ough  side 
of the divide between the is and the ought. e evaluative is oen taken to constitute a 
particular class within the normative. us, philosophers usually distinguish between the 
evaluative and the deontic (from the Greek deon, what is binding), a category to which 
concepts such as obligatory, permitted, and forbidden belong. An important question is 
how the evaluative is related to the deontic, and, more generally, what unies the norma-
tive domain. To put it dierently, how do judgments about what is good or bad relate to 
judgments about what we ought to do? Most would agree that what we ought to do de-
pends on what is good or bad, in the sense that we ought to do what is best, but there are 
deep disagreements as to whether this intuitive idea has to be taken at face value. Indeed, 
one can understand the debates in normative ethics, which concern what agents ought 
6 
at said, it must be noticed that the claim that evaluative concepts can be fully reduced to other kinds 
of normative concepts has its advocates. It is typically defended by those who adhere to a reductivist 
interpretation of the so-called tting-attitude analysis of value (see, for instance, Danielsson and Olson 
(2007)).
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to do, and which oppose consequentialists, deontologists, and virtue ethicists, as turning 
around this very question. Finally, let us mention another set of distinctions that is im-
portant within the normative domain. ese are the broad categories of the moral, the 
prudential, the epistemic, and the esthetic, to name but the most important ones.7 Int r-
estingly, these broad distinctions cut across the deonticevaluative distinction. ink, for 
instance, of the obligation not to harm an innocent person, on the deontic side, and of the 
shamefulness that is involved in cheating, on the evaluative side. Both this obligation and 
this evaluative property clearly fall within the moral.
With these distinctions in hand, let us turn to the main debates in the philosophy of values.
The main debates
e most fundamental questions about the evaluative are divided into four elds, which 
importantly overlap with the distinctions within the evaluative domain sketched in the 
previous section. ese are the ontological questions, which concern the nature of evalu-
ative facts, the semantic questions regarding evaluative sentences, the epistemological ques-
tions, which focus on whether or not there can be knowledge in the evaluative domain, and 
nally what could be called, in analogy with the term moral psychology, the questions 
regarding evaluative psychology, such as that of the relation between evaluative judgments 
and motivation.8 Hotly debated controversies mark each of these elds.
e central question concerning the ontology of the evaluative is whether evaluative 
facts and the properties that constitute them are objective, in the sense that they exist in-
dependently of what we think and feel. Put dierently, objectives facts are not constituted 
by our thoughts or by our feelings, unless what is evaluated is something psychological. 
ere are three main answers to this question in the literature. According to the rst one, 
which characterizes what we will call value realism, evaluative properties, or values for 
short, are objective, and so, of course, are evaluative facts. Values are part of the fabric of 
the world as much as shapes or protons are. Value realists split into dierent subgroups, 
for they disagree among themselves concerning the relation between values and natural 
properties. According to some, values are reducible to natural properties (Railton 1986). 
Another possibility is to maintain that, while values are natural, since evaluative theories
or more generally normative theoriesare on a par with natural sciences, values are none-
theless not reducible to any other natural properties. e claim is that the methods used in 
normative theorizing are not essentially dierent from the one used in physics or biology, 
for instance, so that the entities postulated by both normative theories and natural sciences 
have to be considered to be of the same kind, though not reducible to one another (see 
Boyd 1988; Brink 1989; Sturgeon 1984). Even if they disagree about the reasons why values 
have to be considered natural, and about the way in which they are natural, both kinds of 
realist subscribe to naturalism. Naturalism is not accepted by all realists, however. us, 
7 See Section 2 of this volume for discussions of dierent kinds of values.
8 
ese are the divisions that characterize metaethics. See, for instance, Shafer-Landau 2003.
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non-naturalist realists argue that values are sui generis properties that are distinct from 
natural properties (Moore 1903; Oddie 2009; Shafer-Landau 2003). As we mentioned in 
the previous section, the question that non-naturalist realists have to address is whether 
one can make sense of the idea of properties that are non-natural. If one denes the nat-
ural as what is postulated by natural and social sciences, this question amounts to whether 
there can be things in the world that are not postulated by natural and social sciences.
All these dierent versions of value realism can be contrasted with value anti-realism, 
a stance that is characterized by the rejection of the thesis that there are objective val-
ues. ere is again a variety of options for anti-realists. A prominent anti-realist view, 
sometimes called simple subjectivism, is that values are relative to how people feel. omas 
Hobbes thus writes: But whatsoever is the object of any mans appetite or desire; that is 
it which he for his part calleth good: and the object of this hate, and aversion, evil; and of 
his contempt, vile and inconsiderable. For these words of good, evil, and contemptible, 
are ever used with relation to the person that useth them: there being nothing simply and 
absolutely so; nor any common rule of good and evil, to be taken from the nature of the 
objects themselves. (1651, Chapter VI; see also: Prinz 2007; Westermack 1906). Accord-
ing to simple subjectivism, being good is nothing but to be approved by someone, whether 
approbation is considered to be a specic emotion or a disposition to undergo a number of 
positive emotions. Such an account entails relativism about values, for what you approve 
might well be dierent for what someone else approves. Moreover, nothing would be good 
as such, for goodness would depend on whether or not people have the reaction of ap-
probation or not. ere are other ways to spell out anti-realist accounts; for instance, by 
appealing to the reactions or conventions of specic social groups. us, one could claim 
that to be good depends on what a specic social group agrees upon. Again, this claim en-
tails relativism about values, since dierent groups might agree on dierent conventions.
By contrast with what one might expect, realism and anti-realism are not the only op-
tions. ere is a third main approach in evaluative ontology, value constructivism, which 
rejects both realism and anti-realism. Constructivists claim that both adversaries in this 
debate falsely assume that objectivity and subjectivity are incompatible. What construct-
ivism holds is that evaluative facts, or at least evaluative truths, are constructs that are both 
objective, in the sense of being at least to a certain extent independent of human thought 
and feelings, and subjective, in the sense of being constituted by human activity. Again, 
there are dierent ways to spell out this idea. One possibility is to claim that being good is 
being approved by ideal observers, which are fully knowledgeable and impartial (Brandt 
1954; Firth 1952). Another possibility is to argue that to be good is to be what would be 
approved aer an idealized process of deliberation. Such a constructivist account, which 
many trace back to Immanuel Kant, has been mainly developed in the moral domain 
(Korsgaard 1996; Rawls 1980). Remarkably, David Hume, a philosopher whose approach 
could not be more opposed to that of Kant, has also been seen as an early advocate of a 
Humean kind of constructivism, which has been contrasted with Kantian constructivism 
(Street 2010). e main dierence between the two kinds of constructivism concerns the 
relativity of normative claims, the Kantian constructivist advocating the universality of 
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moral claims, while the Humean constructivist accepts that moral claims are relative to the 
specic standpoints of particular agents.
Value realism is commonly paired with specic stances in semantic, epistemology, and 
evaluative psychology. ese are: (a) cognitivism about evaluative sentences, (b) ration-
alism regarding evaluative knowledge, and (c) externalism with respect to the relation 
between evaluative judgments and motivation. According to cognitivism, evaluative sen-
tences have the same function as sentences about natural facts. us, when we say that 
cheating is shameful, for instance, we aim at saying something true, just as when we say 
that the cat is on the mat. Cognitivism thus holds that evaluative sentences aim at describ-
ing facts and are truth-assessable. Even though cognitivism ts well with how evaluative 
sentences appear to be used, non-cognitivism has had (and still has) a great many advo-
cates. e main non-cognitivist account about evaluative sentences, expressivism, holds 
that the function of evaluative sentences is to express positive and negative emotions or, 
alternatively, attitudes such as desires and aversions (Ayer 1936; Blackburn 1984; Gibbard 
1990; Stevenson 1937). In the former case, evaluative sentences would be of the same kind 
as boo! or hurrah!, two interjections we use to express our positive and negative feel-
ings, respectively. By contrast with a sentence that attributes feelings to persons, such as 
you disapprove of cheating, such interjections and, more generally, expressions of feel-
ings do not aim at describing states of aairs, and they fail to be truth-assessable. Another 
possibility is to opt for prescriptivism, a thesis that usually concerns moral sentences, and 
according to which the function of such sentences is to express imperatives or prescrip-
tions (Hare 1952). On this suggestion, the sentence cheating is bad, for instance, would 
have the same function as the imperative do not cheat!, so that it could not be considered 
to have genuine truth-conditions. is is why both expressivism and prescriptivism are 
considered to be non-cognitive accounts of evaluative language.
It should be underlined here that the distinction between cognitivism and non-
cognitivism is oen pitched at the psychological rather than the semantic level. Cognitiv-
ism about evaluative judgments is the claim that such judgments, like the corresponding 
sentences, are genuinely truth-assessable, a claim that is denied by non-cognitivism about 
evaluative judgments. is contrast is sometimes expressed in terms of cognitive states, such 
as, paradigmatically, beliefs. Accordingly, cognitivism about evaluative judgments amounts 
to the thesis that such judgments are on a par with beliefs, while non-cognitivism denies 
this and stresses the analogies with motivational states, such as, paradigmatically, desires.
Let us get back to value realism. In general, value realists tend to reject scepticism; they 
are in fact optimistic about the prospect of evaluative knowledge. Most oen, realists have 
been, and are still tempted, to argue that knowledge about evaluative facts is obtained 
by the exercise of reason, thus subscribing to rati nalism regarding the epistemology of 
values. According to an important strand of rationalism about evaluative knowledge, in-
tuitionism, such knowledge is grounded on intuitions (Audi 1997; Moore 1903; Shafer-
Landau 2003). Intuitions are oen conceived as states that are immediately justied, in 
the sense that their justication is independent of other states. us, they are believed to 
constitute the foundation of justication and knowledge. Rationalists have other options, 
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however. ey can follow the move made by some moral realists, and argue that evaluative 
knowledge, or at least epistemic justication, depends not on the availability of founda-
tional beliefs, but on the possibility of developing a coherent set of beliefs (Brink 1989; 
Daniels 1979; Rawls 1971). According to coherentism about evaluative beliefs, an evalu-
ative belief would be justied on condition that it belongs to a fully coherent set of beliefs.
Let us make a terminological point here. Rationalism is not merely a claim regarding 
evaluative knowledge. Quite generally, moral (as well as evaluative) rationalism contrasts 
with sentimentalism. Rationalism about the evaluative can be characterized, very roughly, 
as the claim that evaluative judgments are grounded in reason. Kant is without doubt the 
foremost advocate of moral rationalism in the history of philosophy (Kant 1785, 1788). By 
contrast, sentimentalism about evaluative judgments not only denies that evaluative judg-
ments are grounded in reason, but also claims that the ground of the evaluative lies in the 
sentiments. us, Hume, the most prominent moral sentimentalist, famously states that 
morality [. . .] is more properly felt than judgd of  (Treatise, book 3, part 1, section 2) and 
argues that moral distinctions are not derived by reason. Because they take sentiments and 
emotions to be non-cognitive states that are opposed to reason, sentimentalists most oen 
reject value realism and doubt that there can be knowledge in the relevant domain (Nich-
ols 2004; Prinz 2007). As we shall argue, however, this association between anti-realism 
and sentimentalism can and needs to be resisted.
What about the relation between evaluative judgments and motivation? Value realists 
tend to argue against internalism, i.e., the claim that there is an internal or necessary con-
nection between evaluative judgments and motivation. Internalism is particularly attract-
ive in the case of rst-person moral judgments of the deontic kind (Hare 1952; Smith 
1994). It appears plausible that if an agent judges that she ought to perform some action, 
she will be motivated to do so, or at least that, if she fails to be motivated accordingly, she 
can be accused of some kind of rationality failure. What is oen claimed is that if an agent 
is not motivated in accordance with her moral judgments, she manifests practical irration-
ality, such as weakness of will. If this were indeed true of moral judgments, such judgments 
would be importantly dierent from judgments about natural facts, which have no par-
ticular connection to motivation. is is why many moral realists have been tempted by 
externalism (Brink 1989; Railton 1986). Transposed to the case of evaluative judgments, 
the question is whether a judgment like the judgment that this action is the best, say, is 
one that a fully rational agent could make without having any motivation to perform the 
action. As we shall argue, externalism may be more plausible in the case of evaluative judg-
ments than in the case of judgments regarding what I ought to do.
What we have, then, are standard options that characterize realists and anti-realists. 
e standard realist package comprises cognitivism, rationalism, and externalism, while 
the standard anti-realist package is constituted by non-cognitivism, sentimentalism, and 
internalism.9 ere are clear anities between these dierent claims, and indeed, there 
9 Indeed, moral realism and anti-realism are oen dened in conjunctive terms (see, for instance: Railton 
1996; Sayre-McCord 1988; Sturgeon 1984).
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are also a number of logical inferences between specic claims. For instance, if there are 
no evaluative facts, it follows that there will be nothing we can know, so that evaluative 
knowledge is excluded. Nevertheless, it has to be underlined that there are many more 
combinations than there might seem to be at rst sight. Some moral realists have, for in-
stance, argued that their account is compatible with internalism (Shafer-Landau 2003). 
Moreover, as John Mackie (1977) has made clear in the moral case, one can well defend 
both anti-realism and cognitivism. According to the so-called error theory that Mackie 
advocated, moral judgments are fully cognitive, but since there are no objective moral 
facts, they fail to correspond to any reality (Joyce 2001; Olson 2014). Similarly, it could be 
argued that even if evaluative judgments have the sole function of expressing positive and 
negative feelings, this does not entail that there are no evaluative facts. Sadly enough, we 
would simply not be able to refer to such facts. Further possibilities will emerge when we 
discuss the arguments for and against the objectivity of evaluative facts. In particular, we 
shall argue that it is possible to develop an account of the evaluative that is both sentimen-
talist and fully realist.
Anti-realism vs. realism: the arguments
ere are at least three ways to defend a realist stance about values (cf. Shafer-Landau 
2003). e rst consists in oering some positive argument in support of value realism. 
e second consists in arguing that all anti-realist positions face problems so big as to be 
ultimately unappealing. e third consists in rejecting the objections against value realism 
raised by its opponents. Obviously, these strategies are far from incompatible; indeed, it is 
to be expected that a full defense of value realism will combine elements from the three of 
them. In what follows, we shall consider the main arguments pertaining to each of these 
strategies.
One straightforward argument in favor of value realism is based on the phenomenology 
of evaluative judgments (Brink 1989). First, when making an evaluative judgment, we seem 
to express some sort of cognitive state that does not appear to dier, in nature, from ordin-
ary beliefs, such as the belief that the cat is on the mat. Second, our evaluative judgments 
seem to be about an objective evaluative reality, which exists independently of our own atti-
tudes. is is evidenced by the fact that disagreement about value presents itself as genuine 
disagreement, one that can be positively resolved by guring out how things really are. is 
contrasts with the implications of most anti-realist theories, for instance non-cognitivism, 
which depicts evaluative disagreement as some kind of spurious disagreement. Accord-
ing to the value realist, these features of our experience should be taken at face value. is 
means that, unless we have overwhelming reason to think otherwise, we should admit that 
there really are objective evaluative facts and properties, which our evaluative judgments 
attempt to capture. Anyone wishing to defend an anti-realist position must either provide 
an account that accommodates the appearances or explain such appearances away.
Another important consideration that favors value realism comes from linguistic evi-
dence. As is widely acknowledged, evaluative predicates, such as good or admirable, 
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behave like ordinary predicates. us, the structure of Sarah is admirable appears in no 
way dierent from that of  e ball is round. Both types of sentences can be evaluated in 
terms of truth, for we can ask Is it true that Sarah is admirable? just as we can wonder 
whether the ball is round. us, the two types of sentences appear to have cognitive con-
tents that are genuinely truth-assessable. Since this is just what is to be expected if value 
realism holds, it provides us with a reason to embrace the claim that there are objective 
evaluative facts. Whether this consideration is conclusive depends on whether the anti-
realist can satisfactorily account for these features of evaluative discourse.
e second strategy to defend value realism consists in casting doubt on rival ac-
counts. Consider the most prominent non-cognitivist account, expressivism. Expres-
sivism oers a clear account of the meaning of evaluative expressions when they appear 
in assertoric contexts. According to this view, the sentence  e cat is amusing ex-
presses an attitude of amusement toward the cat. However, this cannot be the full story. 
In fact, the same evaluative expressions are oen embedded in more complex sentences, 
such as conditionals, negations, and so on, where no attitude seems to be positively 
expressed. If so, non-cognitivists owe us an explanation of the meaning of evaluative 
expressions when they occur in such non-assertoric contexts. More specically, non-
cognitivism must explain how the meaning of complex evaluative sentences derives 
from the meaning of their parts and to do this in a way that preserves and explains the 
semantic properties of such sentences. is task has proven to be quite dicult. Indeed, 
one oen-rehearsed objection against non-cognitivism, the so-called Fr ge–Geach prob-
lem, is that the view is incapable of successfully explaining how arguments featuring 
evaluative statements can be logically valid (Geach 1960, 1965). Consider, for example, 
the following train of thought: the cat is wet; if the cat is wet, it is funny; hence, the cat is 
funny. ere is little doubt that this is a valid inference, in the sense that the conclusion 
is bound to be true if the premises are.10 e problem is that it is dicult to see how 
this can be so if we assume, with expressivism, that the conclusion merely expresses the 
attitude of amusement. No attitude appears to be expressed when we utter If the cat is 
wet, it is funny, for in this context,  e cat is funny is not asserted. So, strictly speaking 
the conclusion cannot follow from the premises. Insofar as value realism is committed 
to cognitivism, it is immune from this problem and, consequently, appears to be a more 
plausible position.11
Value realists have, however, to deal with a battery of objections from the anti-realist 
camp. Drawing partly on Hume (173941), John Mackie (1977) has provided a classic 
statement of several of these objections, so it may be useful to start our presentation from 
there. Mackies rst argument, which is known as the argument from disagreement, targets 
value realisms capacity to account for the phenomenon of radical and persistent evaluative 
10 As shown by Tappolet (1997), such inferences thus make for a problem for those who claim that moral 
truth is distinct from ordinary truth.
11 See Schroeder (2007) for a recent extensive discussion of the Frege–Geach problem and the attempts 
made by expressivists to overcome it.
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disagreement. It seems evident to many that the evaluative judgments made by dier-
ent individuals or groups present a large degree of variation, both historically and inter-
culturally. By itself, this is no reason to conclude that value realism is false. Aer all, there 
has been, and there still is, disagreement about scientic theories. is is generally not 
regarded as a reason to think that there is no fact of the matter capable of adjudicating be-
tween such theories. However, the alleged disagreement about values is supposed to pres-
ent a more signicant problem for value realism when it is combined with the view that the 
evaluative and the scientic domains are relevantly disanalogous. In order to characterize 
this disanalogy more precisely, some point out that there exists no method for deciding 
cases of evaluative disagreement comparable to the method used in science to resolve cases 
of scientic disagreement (Ayer 1936; Sturgeon 1984, 2006). Others claim that, supposedly 
unlike scientic disagreement, evaluative disagreement may persist under idealized con-
ditions. According to this line of thought, it is a genuine possibility that dierent, perfectly 
rational and well-informed agents may fail to converge on the same evaluative judgments, 
through no fault of their own (Blackburn 1981; Shafer-Landau 2003). e next step of 
the argument consists in claiming that the best explanation of the disagreement in the 
evaluative domain is that there is no objective evaluative fact to be discovered. Rather, the 
observed disagreement seems to reect the fact that values are inherently subjective, in 
that they depend on the perspective, culture or ways of life in which the individuals are 
immersed.
Mackies second argument is the so-called argument from queerness (Mackie 1977). As 
Mackie points out, this argument has two parts: one metaphysical (or ontological) and one 
epistemological. He claims that [i]f there were objective values, they would be entities 
or qualities or relations of a very strange sort, utterly dierent from anything else in the 
universe. Correspondingly, if we were aware of them, it would have to be by some special 
faculty of moral perception or intuition, utterly dierent from our ordinary ways of know-
ing everything else (Mackie 1977: 38). According to Mackie, objective evaluative facts 
provide the knower with both a direction and an overriding motive; somethings being 
good both tells the person who knows this to pursue it and makes him pursue it (Mackie 
1977: 40). Since ordinary facts appear to lack the same action-guidingness and motiv-
ational force, objective values look queer.
Let us elaborate on Mackies argument, starting with its epistemological part. Mackie 
specically targets moral intuitionism. His idea is that our knowledge of evaluative facts 
could not come from any of our ordinary perceptual or rational faculties, but only from 
some mysterious faculty of intuition or evaluative perception. However, the appeal to such 
a faculty seems suspect. Indeed, if our commitment to value realism forces us to adopt 
such an account, we would do better to revise our commitment. Mackies worry is some-
times spelt out in terms of epistemic access. Accordingly, if values exist independently of 
us and if they are dierent from ordinary facts in the way that Mackie assumes, then it is 
unclear by what means we could acquire knowledge of, or justied beliefs about, them. 
Alternatively, the challenge for value realists is to oer an account of how we can form jus-
tiable evaluative judgments about a supposedly independent evaluative reality, in a way 
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that does not look like a miraculous coincidence and that is consistent with what we know 
about ourselves and about how our evolutionary history from other scientic disciplines 
(Street 2006).
Consider now the second part of Mackies argument. For reasons of space, we shall sim-
ply focus on the relation between values and motivation. at there is such an intimate 
relation between the two is oen considered a platitude in the philosophical literature, 
a claim already made by Hume (173941: book 3, part 1, section 1). As we have seen, 
many think that values and motivation are linked by an internal or necessary relation. 
More precisely, the claim is that, by conceptual necessity, if someone judges that an item 
is characterized by some positive value, then she will somehow be motivated to pursue 
it. For instance, R. M. Hare argues that if someone assents to a moral judgments and is 
sincere, then she will act accordingly, unless she is not free to do that (Hare 1952). Hares 
formulation has the defect of rendering cases of weakness of will (or akrasia) seemingly 
impossible. Indeed, if Hare is right, it is simply impossible for an agent to freely act against 
her moral judgments. Similarly, if judging that an action is the best necessarily entails per-
forming that action, then it is impossible for the agent to freely act against that evaluative 
judgment. is strong form of internalism is oen taken to contrast too drastically with 
our ordinary experience. In order to make room for cases of weakness of will, some au-
thors have thus proposed to weaken Hares formulation. What we should say, according 
to them, is simply that if an agent sincerely judges that an item is characterized by some 
positive value, then she will be motivated to pursue it, unless she is practically irrational 
(Smith 1994). Put dierently, the agent who is not motivated to follow her evaluative 
judgment suers from weakness of will or other kinds of practical rationality failure. Be 
that as it may, Mackies worry is that if our value judgments reliably track an objective 
evaluative reality, then they reveal to us that such an objective evaluative reality has the 
power of directly motivating those who have access to it (or at least those who have access 
to it and are rational). is appears quite extraordinary. How could some objective facts, 
which exist independently of our attitudes, engage our will in such a direct way? is fea-
ture seems to demarcate evaluative facts from all other ordinary facts with which we are 
acquainted.
is argument can actually be transformed into a positive argument in favor of non-
cognitivism, when it is combined with the so-called Humean theory of motivation (see 
Smith 1994 for this argument). e central idea of the Humean theory of motivation is 
that, conceived of as purely cognitive states, beliefs alone cannot motivate one to act. Some 
non-cognitive attitudestypically, desiresmust always be present in order for one to be 
motivated to act. However, if we accept this account, together with the idea that evaluative 
judgments are necessarily motivating, it immediately follows that evaluative judgments 
cannot express beliefs. If they did, they would not motivate a rational agent necessarily, 
but only contingently, that is, in combination with some external motivational state. us, 
if we want to preserve an internalist conception of evaluative judgments, it appears that we 
have no choice but to abandon the cognitivist understanding of evaluative judgments and, 
with it, value realism.
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Another anti-realist argument challenges the value realists capacity to explain how 
evaluative facts depend on natural facts. Speaking in terms of normative facts, Mackie 
presents the challenge thus: What is the connection between the natural fact that an ac-
tion is a piece of deliberate crueltysay, causing pain just for funand the moral fact that 
it is wrong? It cannot be an entailment, a logical or semantic necessity. Yet it is not merely 
that the two features occur together. e wrongness must somehow be consequential or 
supervenient: it is wrong because it is a piece of deliberate cruelty. But just what in the 
world is signied by this because? (Mackie 1977: 44). Value realists are, indeed, typically 
committed to the supervenience thesis, according to which it is impossible for two items to 
have the same natural properties but not the same evaluative properties. e idea is that 
evaluative properties are xed by natural properties, in such a way that if two items have 
the same natural properties, they have also the same evaluative properties. e superveni-
ence thesis is generally held to be a conceptual truth. us, one cannot possibly judge, of 
two qualitatively identical things, that one is, for example, admirable, while the other is 
not, without manifesting some sort of conceptual confusion.
According to its opponents, however, value realism has a hard time in explaining why 
the supervenience relation holds. e source of the problem lies in the value realists com-
mitment to an additional thesis, namely, the lack of entailment thesis. According to it, no 
set of natural truths entails a corresponding set of evaluative truths. In other words, evalu-
ative statements cannot be logically derived from natural statements. e motivation for 
adopting the lack of entailment thesis comes primarily from Moores rejection of natural-
ism or, more precisely, from the rejection of analytic naturalism. Moores argument, which 
has become known as the open question argument, is that it is always possible for one to 
doubt whether some item possessing some natural property, say the property of promot-
ing biological tness, also possesses an evaluative property, say the property of being good, 
without manifesting any conceptual confusion. Moore takes this to be evidence that evalu-
ative concepts cannot be reduced to natural concepts. Put dierently, evaluative concepts 
resist analysis in terms of natural concepts. In the absence of conceptual entailment based 
on such an analysis, however, it is dicult to explain why the supervenience relation holds. 
Indeed, there should be no reason to think that a mixed world, in which two items have 
the same grounding (or subvenient) properties, but not the same evaluative properties, is 
conceptually impossible.
By contrast, anti-realist theories seem to have less trouble in explaining the superveni-
ence of the evaluative on the natural. In fact, some have thought that the argument from 
supervenience especially favors non-cognitivism. Blackburn, for one, has argued that the 
purpose of evaluative discourse is not to describe an evaluative reality, but to guide de-
sires and choices among the natural features of the world (Blackburn 1993: 137). Now, 
according to Blackburn, if it were possible to judge that two items possess the same natural 
properties, but not the same evaluative properties, then evaluative discourse would com-
pletely lose its point; that is, it would be incapable of fullling its action-guiding function. 
us, supervenience holds no mystery. One can explain it simply by pointing out the role 
of evaluative concepts in guiding behavior.
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Like some of the previous anti-realist arguments, Blackburns argument from super-
venience is an instance of a more general strategy against value realism, which has been 
powerfully defended by Gilbert Harman (1977). e idea is simple. According to Harman, 
we have reasons to believe in the existence of some property only if that property gures in 
one of our best explanations of some phenomena in the world. However, evaluative prop-
erties do not seem to play any role in our best explanations. erefore, we have no reason 
to believe in their existence.
Harman emphasizes the dierence between ethics and science. He considers the fol-
lowing example. When seeing a vapor cloud in a cloud chamber, a physicist immediately 
utters:  ere goes a proton! e physicists underlying judgment can be partly explained 
by the fact that she endorses a specic physical theory, which causes her to form the im-
mediate belief that there is a proton. However, Harman thinks that our explanation can 
proceed even further. More specically, Harman believes that the fact that there really was 
a proton is part of a more complete and powerful explanation of why the physicist made 
that judgment. In other words, according to Harman, the truth of the theory is part of the 
best explanation of the physicists observation in the cloud chamber.
Modifying Harmans own example so as to t the present discussion, consider now the 
case of an evaluative observation. Suppose that an individual watching the antics of a wet 
cat exclaims: How amusing! We can certainly explain the individuals judgment by ref-
erence to the standards of amusement that she more or less consciously endorses, and that 
cause her to judge that the cat is amusing. Can we go beyond that? Can we infer that the cat 
really possesses the objective property of being amusing? Harman is skeptical. According 
to him, the existence of mind-independent evaluative properties does not play any role in 
the best explanation of the individuals judgment. In fact, postulating an objective prop-
erty of amusement is completely irrelevant. is is so because there is a better explanation 
of the individuals judgment, which appeals to her psychological make-up, her social and 
cultural upbringing, and so on, rather to the existence of an objective evaluative reality.
Perspectives
Given these dierent arguments, defending value realism might seem to be a tall order. A 
promising line, however, is to explore possibilities that fall outside of the standard realist 
package we presented in the Section e main debates. As we explained, value realism 
is commonly paired with rationalism regarding evaluative knowledge. In this last section, 
we will consider a defense of value realism, which combines value realism and sentimen-
talism, and which we shall call sentimental realism.
e central claim of sentimental realism concerns evaluative concepts. As we men-
tioned, concepts such as dmirable, shameful, or disgusting have obviously a tight con-
nection to emotions. Such value concepts appear essentially related to specic responses. 
A plausible way to spell out the r sponse-dependence of such concepts is by formulating 
equivalences like the following:
x is admirable if and only if feeling admiration is appropriate in response to x.
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It is of course easy to formulate similar equivalences regarding the amusing, the disgust-
ing, the shameful, and so forth. Let us make clear that according to the most plausible 
interpretation of such equivalences, they are not to be taken as proposing conceptual or 
ontological reductions.12 e best way to interpret such equivalences is to read them as 
proposing conceptual elucidations. e equivalence would express the thought that the 
concept admirable is conceptually connected to the concept admiration, but none of the 
concepts should be considered to be more fundamental. On such a no-priority view, the 
grasp of the two concepts would be interdependent. A second important issue is that, on 
the most plausible understanding of such equivalences, appropriateness has to be taken 
to be a matter of correct representation. Put dierently, an appropriate emotion would be 
one that is correct from the epistemic point of view, in the sense that it represents things as 
they are, evaluatively speaking.13 According to such an account, something is admirable if 
and only if it is such that feeling admiration is correct in response to it, and this is so only 
if it is admirable.14
Now, what has to be underlined is that this account of evaluative concepts is entirely 
compatible with value realism. It is perfectly possible to claim that evaluative concepts are 
response-dependent in the sense that the envisaged equivalences are true of such concepts, 
while also maintaining that there are objective evaluative properties, which we try to pick 
out when making evaluative judgments. Indeed, while the proposed interpretation of the 
equivalences is compatible with anti-realism, it goes best with a realist account of values, 
according to which our evaluative judgments can correctly represent evaluative facts.
In addition to these claims regarding evaluative concepts and properties, sentimental 
realism subscribes to a specic epistemology of values. Indeed, the main virtue of the pro-
posed account is that it is grounded on what is arguably a plausible account of emotions, 
the so-called perceptual theory of emotions, according to which emotions are perceptual 
experiences of a particular kind.15 What is specic about emotions, on this account, is that 
they represent things as having evaluative properties. us, an emotion of admiration with 
respect to a friend will be correct just in case the friend is really admirable. An important 
12 In this, sentimental realism diers from the so-called tting attitude analysis. See Deonna and Teroni 
(this volume).
13 See Tappolet (2011).
14 One might worry that such an account would not be illuminating enough to be of interest. It appears 
that what is proposed is simply that something is admirable just in case it is admirable. However, there 
is reason to think that in spite of its circularity, the resulting equivalence is of interest. As will become 
apparent, what it underlines is the crucial epistemic role that emotions play in our grasp of aective con-
cepts. As David Wiggins (1987) suggested, the important point to keep in mind is that there is nothing 
more fundamental to appeal to than admiration when we try to nd out whether or not something is 
admirable, and the same can be said about other evaluative concepts of the same kind.
15 See: de Sousa 1987, 2002; Deonna 2006; Döring 2007; Goldie 2009; Johnston 2001; Meinong 1917; Prinz 
2004, 2006; Tappolet 1995, 2000, 2012; Tye 2008. For critical discussions, see: Brady 2013; Deonna and 
Teroni 2012.
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point here is that on this account, emotions have representational, albeit not conceptu-
ally articulated, content.16 Emotions represent their object as having specic evaluative 
properties, that is, as being fearsome or disgusting, and so on, even though the agent who 
undergoes the emotion need not possess the relevant evaluative concepts (the concepts 
fearsome, disgusting, etc.).
With these claims in hand, it is easy to see how one can defend sentimental realism 
against some of the objections to realism that we mentioned. ere is no need to elaborate 
on the point that if emotions are perceptual experiences of values, then we have a ready 
answer to the epistemological worries raised by Mackie. Moreover, given that emotions 
normally come with related motivations, sentimentalist realism is also in a position to 
handle the challenges related to internalism. Even though making an evaluative judgment 
does not necessarily involve a motivation to act, it will normally be accompanied by such 
a motivation, given that such judgments are grounded in the corresponding emotional 
reactions. If so, it is not necessary to postulate objective entities possessing magical motiv-
ational properties, in order to account for the motivational force of evaluative judgments.
While these points make the proposed account promising, a note of caution is in order. 
As spelt out, this account concerns only evaluative concepts that are explicitly related to 
emotions. So, the question arises as to how sentimental realism can be extended to the 
more general concepts of good and bad, as well as to thick evaluative concepts, such as 
courageous or generous, which might be thought to be more independent from emotions. 
Moreover, while sentimental realism brings in new resources in defense of value realism, 
it does not have a specic answer to all of the objections discussed in the previous section. 
is is not to say that it has no answer, but only that, with respect to some objections, sen-
timental realism will share its responses with alternative value realist accounts.
Consider the objection from supervenience. e sentimental realist may choose be-
tween several available options. One possibility is to argue that evaluative properties are 
identical to natural properties. To give just one example, a sentimental realist may claim 
that the property of being admirable is identical to a complex natural property, which 
can be correctly represented by the reaction of admiration. If this account is adopted, the 
puzzle of supervenience immediately disappears. Indeed, if two items possess the same 
natural properties, then they will necessarily have the same evaluative properties, simply 
because the latter are identical to (a subset of) the former. Given the variety of the natural 
features on which the value property supervenes, the question is whether these natural fea-
tures really constitute a genuine natural property.17 Alternatively, the sentimental realist 
may deny that the supervenience relation is a conceptual truth (see Harrison 2013). For 
instance, one may retreat to the idea that the supervenience relation holds only by meta-
physical necessity, i.e., it is true in all possible worlds, but not in virtue of the very meaning 
16 For non-conceptual contents, see inter alia: Evans 1982; Peacocke 1992. For critical discussion, see: 
Brady 2013; Deonna and Teroni 2012; Deonna and Teroni (this volume); Dokic and Lemaire 2013.
17 See Deonna and Teroni (this volume).
01-Brosch-Chap01.indd   19 16/06/15   2:06 PM
OUP-FIRST UNCORRECTED PROOF, June 16, 2015
A PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE?20
of evaluative concepts. If this is the case, there is indeed no conceptual ban on mixed 
worlds in which two items have the same natural properties, but not the same evaluative 
properties, even though such worlds are metaphysically impossible. is is because meta-
physical necessity is weaker than conceptual necessity, i.e., it is possible for one to conceive 
of things that are false in all possible worlds.
What about the issue of the explanatory role of evaluative properties? To begin with, 
the sentimental realist may notice that Harmans challenge can be understood in dierent 
ways. According to one reading, the reason why evaluative facts do not play any role in 
our best explanations is that they are causally inecacious. In response, the sentimental 
realist may argue, on one hand, that evaluative facts, such as the fact that someone is ad-
mirable, are typically cited as causes of some events, such as the response of admiration of 
a person in normal conditions; and, on the other hand, that the causal requirement is too 
strong, since it excludes too many necessary entities or properties (e.g., numbers, scientic 
laws, etc.) from our best explanations. According to a second reading, the gist of Harmans 
argument is that the positing of evaluative facts violates a methodological principle of ex-
planatory parsimony, according to which one should avoid postulating further entities or 
properties unless they are explanatory useful. In response, the sentimental realist may ei-
ther argue that evaluative facts are needed in order to explain at least some phenomena in 
the world or maintain that evaluative facts, though explanatorily redundant, are neverthe-
less deliberatively indispensable. e idea is that we cannot but postulate such facts when 
we reason about what to do (Enoch 2011). e existence of evaluative facts would thus be 
justied through an inference to the best justication, rather than through an inference to 
the best explanation (Sayre-McCord 1988).
ese are only some examples of how sentimental realism can deal with the remain-
ing anti-realist objections. By way of conclusion, what needs to be kept in mind is that, 
while sentimental realism is on a par with other realist accounts of value in the way it ad-
dresses the latter objections, it appears at the same time to oer a more intuitive account of 
evaluative concepts and a naturalistically more attractive response to the arguments from 
epistemology and motivation. Of course, more needs to be said in order to provide a full 
defense of sentimental realism. What we hope to have shown here, however, is that senti-
mental realism must be taken very seriously in future debates about values.18
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